ADELINA KRUPSKI

MODERN SOCIETY

NOVEMBER 11, 2006

The Soviet era, a crucial period not only for the Russian empire and its republics, but also for the rest of the world, continues to influence millions of people’s lives because of its enormous impact on the political, economic and social elements of the twentieth century. Different conceptions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) play a fundamental role in Russia’s search for a national identity. Yet, the Soviet phenomenon remains immensely misunderstood, mainly as a result of propaganda and extreme secrecy. In The Soviet Century, Moshe Lewin successfully brings to the surface many of the unknown and neglected aspects of the Soviet system. Through the consultation of a mass of new materials and previously inaccessible archives, Lewin uncovers the inner workings of the Soviet Union, while focusing on the ways of its leaders and the social consequences of their actions.

The first point made by Lewin relates to scholarly research on and representations of the Soviet system, stating that, “while many other problems, countries and histories were open to debate, when it came to Soviet Russia a ‘public discourse’ emerged, based on deeply ingrained but unverified assumptions.” Lewin identifies three main rigid thought patterns prevailing in the international community in regard to the Soviet Union. First, concentrating on leaders and government agencies as the main driving force. Second, focusing on the USSR’s ‘undemocratic’ status. Third, and most severe, ignoring the historical context in which the leaders operated and to which they reacted. In addition, Lewin discusses the tendency to ‘demonise’ Stalin. The introduction clarifies the aim of the book; to present general aspects of the system, rather than to offer a history of the USSR. It also informs the reader of the book’s division into three parts: the Stalinist period, the post-Stalinist period and the ‘Soviet era’ as a whole.

Part one leads directly into the 1930s, a time during which Russia underwent tremendously rapid changes. According to Lewin, “the period 1928-39 unquestionably stands out because, although brief, it condenses all the past and future problems of the Soviet system.” The lead-up to this important stage in Russian history includes an introduction to the character of Stalin. The account of Stalin's involvement in the Bolshevik Party, posing as a Leninist, gives an insight into his secretive and scheming nature. When presenting the leaders of the Soviet era, Lewin provides background information to the historical circumstances, as well as their effect on governance. For example, Lewin makes it clear that Stalin’s experience of the Civil War gave rise to his extremely authoritarian personality and contributed directly to his vision of the form that the State should take. Lenin had nominated Stalin as general secretary, though Lenin’s illness made it easier for Stalin to rise to power and ultimately, after the adoption of his plans for the constitutional form of the USSR, gain total control.

Lewin continues with a discussion of Stalin’s hostile attitude towards Lenin and Trotsky. The three protagonists strongly disputed the shape of the future State and the clash between Lenin and Stalin had far-reaching consequences for the system. In a text delivered to the Politburo, Lenin even demanded the removal of Stalin from his post. However, this remained unrevealed to the Soviet public until some thirty-three years later. According to Lenin, “Stalin wished to give the non-Russian nationalities ‘autonomy‘ - meaning that they would become part of Russia or, in other words, administrative units subordinate to Russia.” In 1922, Stalin presented his plan, which involved the five independent Soviet states, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaidzhan, becoming part of the Russian Federation. “Their own commissariats of foreign affairs, foreign trade, defense, railways, finance and communications should merge with those of Russia.” Confronted with Lenin's concept of independence of the republics, Stalin rejected all but one of Lenin’s proposed amendments. Lewin states that Lenin undoubtedly sensed the outcome and, for this reason, made it clear in his testament that Stalin should no longer occupy his party post. According to Lewin, “in Lenin’s eyes, Stalin’s project basically harked back to an old-style imperial autocracy.” Stalin’s clear and simple vision further demonstrates his Civil War influence.

Next, Lewin further clarifies Stalin’s political designs and personality by focusing on the way the cadres and the Party functioned. Stalin, described as “taciturn and forever cautious,” held very clear views regarding the function of State and Party. Stalin’s perception of the exercise of power becomes evident from his declarations to students at the Sverdlov Party University, where he explains that “if things are not progressing, or if they go wrong, the cause is not to be sought in any objective conditions: it is the fault of the cadres.” In other words, the leader sets the tasks but has no liability for poor decisions or results. That is, Stalin strongly believed in finding and punishing the culprit, a procedure frequently carried out without any basis on facts. For instance, an unanswered telegram from Stalin to Roosevelt led to an investigation and the subsequent expulsion of the head of the cipher department from the Party, as well as his disappearance, even though the fault probably lay with the American State Department. In order to further build on this image of his power, Stalin also went as far as attempting to erase Trotsky from Soviet history by giving himself credit for Trotsky’s achievements. Examples such as these demonstrate Stalin’s level of self-centeredness and envy.

The word ‘cult’ often comes up in Lewin’s description of the system under Stalin. In fact, there is evidence that Stalin’s years in the Orthodox seminary, where he received his only systematic education, greatly influenced him. The author reflects on the concept of heresy and its use in politics. In the case of Stalinism, ‘deviation’ takes the place of ‘sin’ and, as Stalin clarified, “begins as soon as one of the party faithful starts to ‘entertain doubts.’” According to Lewin, the attribution of superhuman qualities to the supreme ruler and the practice of heresy-hunting justify the use of the term ‘cult.’ As for the Party, Stalin turned it into a tool for controlling the State. Rapid changes came about as a result of massive recruitment of new members and the elimination of successive oppositions. Most importantly, as Stalin became ‘sole ruler,’ party members had no control over member selection and were deprived of the ability to change party leadership through elections. A narrative of personal accounts helps the reader imagine the difficulty and danger of working for the Party during this portion of the Soviet era. “Between 1922 and 1935 approximately one and a half million members left the party.” However, the Party continued to increase in size during the 1930s and, as a result, grew more complex.

The strict centralization of internal party affairs meant that the Politburo received many items on its agenda ordinarily outside its concern, while the truly important ones received no attention. The extremely low living standards, chronic food shortages and neglect of public services justify the mass departure of members from the Party. Lewin makes the point that office employees received higher wages than industrial workers, despite the fact that the majority of workers, employees and even those holding responsible positions had a similarly low educational level. However, the regime distributed perks and privileges to the top layers, strengthening the ‘status revolution’ as social divisions continued to widen. Lewin refers to ‘employees,’ ‘specialists,’ ‘intelligentsia’ and ‘office-holders’ as the main categories, describing them separately. Other factors of change in the economy included collectivization, urbanization and industrialization, described as the three powerful ‘transformers.’ This section supplies the reader with a series of statistics that show the scale of town growth. Not only were millions of peasants moving into towns, but also masses of people abandoned urban areas, creating population flows in the opposite direction. This led to a dramatic housing problem; people found shelter in barracks or in the corner of a shared room while whole families were crammed into primitive communal apartments, mostly deprived of sanitation, running water or central heating.

The lower classes and members of the Party alike initiated hundreds of strikes throughout the country, despite the fact that “any large-scale expression of popular discontent or sustained, sharp criticism was regarded as dangerous.” At the height of Stalin’s Terror, the Soviet regime had developed powerful instruments of suppression, notably the criminal code, the far-reaching network of informers and the secret police to enforce its authority. An amendment to the law defining ‘counter-revolutionary crimes’ enabled the government to “prosecute and punish without real proof - i.e., without the ‘culprit’ having actually committed a crime.” At this point, having established that Stalin held all the power in his hands, Lewin turns to Stalin’s methods for ruling Russia. The decision in 1937 to redistribute functions and responsibilities within the Politburo formed part of Stalin’s plan to dissolve and weaken the power of his close associates in order to prevent any of them from accumulating too much authority. “Stalin conceived himself as an autocrat and was determined not to share his place and image with anyone else, past or present.” Stalin had spies supplying him with information he could use against the other leaders. Moreover, he persecuted members of their families to test and confirm their loyalty. Based on an extended examination of the purges of party cadres, launched in 1937, Lewin effectively provides witness to the Soviet Terror.

During this horrific time, commanders were required to carry out orders and fulfill quotas, without even having to prove accusations. Going beyond the required quotas earned them bonuses, promotions and wage increases. “Between 1937 and 1939, Stalin and Molotov personally signed around 400 lists of people to be executed (a total of 44,000 names),” all this purely because Stalin felt he needed to consolidate his authority by removing those who did not conform to the system. Naturally, the purges had serious effects on the economy, the bureaucracy, the Party and cultural life. In 1939, Stalin announced that “more than 500,000 cadres had been recruited to breathe new energy into state and party administration, particularly at the top levels.” The recruitment of another million new members took place in that same year and, according to Lewin, everything appeared to have gone back to ‘normal.’ However, the suppressive practices did not come to an end. The government made sure that methods used during interrogation, such as torturing people and forcing them to sign ‘confessions,’ remained undisclosed. In addition, the Gulag, a new administrative agency created to manage the prison system, worked with a large network of industrial administrative agencies created by the NKVD that, as Lewin uncovers, used slave labour to construct roads, railways and canals. Much secrecy surrounded the camps, allowing the Gulag’s administration to get away with theft, embezzlement, false reporting and criminal treatment of camp inmates. Far from exerting any influence to moderate these excesses, the government simply ignored them, leaving the populace during this period of Soviet dominance at the mercy of increasingly paranoid and unscrupulous leadership.

Lewin demonstrates that positive changes came about immediately after Stalin’s death, starting with the cancellation of prison terms and the employment of detainees as free wage-earners. “On Khrushchev’s initiative, the regime had begun to review the Stalinist policy of terror.” Understandably, reconstructing the system proved an to be an immense and difficult task. Lewin not only expands upon the reconstruction of the system, taking a close look at elements such as the dismantling of the Gulag, the creation of a proper justice system and the transition to national economic planning, but also reflects on Stalin’s regime, seeking to answer the question, “Why was the cult of Stalin so successful?” and arguing that, as a result of the shortage of information, people were simply ignorant of the Terror and unable to comprehend the extent of the immorality of their leader's actions. The West, on the other hand, “horrified and fascinated by the absurdity of Stalin’s repression, and amply supplied with data about it…readily accepted the idea that it continued on the same scale and with the same means after his demise.” Although, according to Lewin, the two periods are incomparable as to the degree of suppression of the populace, many classic Soviet characteristics remained in place. Despite reforms under Khrushchev, problems from the old system continued to exist and the beginning of the 1960s saw a slowdown in economic growth, along with a severe shortage of labour. “What happened to the Soviet system from the late 1960s onwards marks the re-emergence of a whole series of traits that had plagued Tsarist Russia for centuries, and which Russia never managed to divest itself of.” Lewin describes the construction of the system ‘from the top down’ as a mould in which it remained until the very end and introduces a number of ‘dynamic and capable characters,’ including Alexei Kosygin and Yuri Andropov, who, like Khrushchev, attempted to change this modus operandi.

In conclusion, The Soviet Century, one of Lewin’s numerous works on Russian history, presents a clear and straightforward account of the Soviet Union, a complex regime that the international community will continue to study for a significant time into the future. “Given easier access to the archives,…a more balanced approach to the Soviet era…is not only possible, but indispensable.” It provides the reader with an amazing collection of information, gathered from a wide range of sources, including archives, memoirs, autobiographies and current work by Russian scholars. Not only does Lewin effectively communicate the main elements of the Stalinist and post-Stalinist periods, but he also offers a clear examination of the Soviet era overall, evaluating the way in which these separate historical elements worked together to form today’s Russia and reminding the reader that, as declared by the political philosopher V.P. Mezhuev, ‘a country cannot exist without its history.’